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Academics and lawyers 
need to be more vigilant 
in ensuring that judges can 
operate in environments 
in which they can exercise 
their functions without 
fear, favor, or prejudice.
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The Vulnerability of Judges in 
Contemporary Africa: Alarming Trends
Tabeth Masengu
The judicialization of politics has been described as one 
of the most significant phenomena of late twentieth- and 
early twenty-first-century government. The courts have more 
judicial muscle than they did centuries ago, but it would be 
a mistake to assume that with more power has come more 
protection. This article discusses judicial independence by 
highlighting some concerning instances of judicial interfer-
ence that have occurred in sub-Saharan Africa since 2010. In 
my discussion of these threats, I highlight that the executive 
is not the only avenue by which interference in the judiciary 
occurs. I conclude with suggestions of ways in which judges 
as social actors can mitigate undue influence and present a 
stronger judiciary.
In September 2015, local investigative journalist Anas Aremeyaw Anas 
publicized his documentary on corruption in the Ghanaian judiciary. He 
documented twelve High Court judges, twenty-two other judges, and 140 
other court officials accepting bribes, effectively debunking the widely held 
belief that judges are above reproach.1 The implications of the documentary 
were damning, not only for the judges and court officials involved, but for 
the judiciary as a whole. The judiciary is often viewed as the shield to pro-
tect a country’s citizenry in an era in which some leaders continue to use 
authoritarian methods to extend their stay in power or to crush dissenting 
voices.2 As a consequence of this, a focus has been on what the courts and 
judges can do for citizens, with insufficient consideration of what happens 
when the guardians of our courts need guarding, too.
Former Lesotho Chief Justice M. L. Lehohla, in a speech at the South-
ern African Chief Justices Forum, stated, “most pernicious of the challenges 
facing judiciaries in Africa today is that of undue interference or influence 
in one form or another,” and despite the outlawing of undue interference 
with the judiciary in most constitutions, African executives had a growing 
tendency to exert political leverage or control over the judiciary (2010:3). 
Similarly, at the same forum, Zimbabwean Chief Justice Godfrey Chidyasiku 
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pointed out that challenges to judicial independence were likelier to take 
a subtler form than their precursors; the pressures, he continued, “if more 
subtle, are nonetheless insidious” (2010:10).
The alteration of the political landscape in Africa in the early 1990s has 
played a significant role in creating environments where these pressures have 
become common. Since the early 1990s, we have witnessed the concomitant 
emergence of courts endowed with powers of judicial review and the creation 
of a robust bill of rights in a number of African countries (Ellet 2015:6). This 
emergence of judicial power has often led to contestation with other organs 
of state, especially the executive. Instances in which judges or their positions 
have been threatened in overt and sometimes covert ways have increased 
in the last decade. This has led to the need to discuss the vulnerability of 
judges in contemporary Africa, especially as the courts become bolder and 
more willing to exercise their judicial muscle.
This article examines the issue of judicial interference, with an empha-
sis on a few key incidents that have been identified in the sub-Saharan region 
since 2010. I commence with a brief discussion of judicial independence and 
the judicialization of politics. I then examine the issue of judicial interfer-
ence by drawing attention to some concerning incidents, emanating from 
within the judiciary, as well as from the executive. I draw heavily from the 
works of Peter VonDoepp, Rachel Ellet, and Jennifer Widner, who have con-
ducted research on the African continent. By discussing topical examples of 
judicial interference, I provide evidence that supports these scholars’ theo-
ries. Finally, I suggest three practical ways for judges to strengthen their own 
independence and that of the judiciary as a whole.
Judicial Independence and the Role of the Courts
Judicial independence and judicial accountability are not mutually exclusive, 
but accountability does not negate the importance of independence. Article 
2 of Siracusa’s Draft Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary states 
that judicial independence means:
(a) That every judge is free to decide matters before him in
accordance with his assessment of the facts and his under-
standing of the law without any improper influences, induce-
ments, or pressures, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for
any reason, and
(b) That the Judiciary is independent of the Executive and
Legislature, and has jurisdiction, directly or by way of review.
(UN Committee of Experts 1981).
Despite numerous guidelines on judicial independence,3 contention contin-
ues to exist because the role of the courts has evolved over time, and judges 
find themselves adjudicating matters that are seemingly political, as opposed 
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to just commercial and criminal. This has led to what is commonly referred 
to as the judicialization of politics.
The judicialization of politics is the ever-accelerating reliance on 
courts and judicial means for addressing core moral predicaments, public 
policy questions, and political controversies, as courts have delved into 
megapolitics—political controversies that define the boundaries of the col-
lective or cut through the heart of entire nations (Hirschl 2008:5). Matters 
described as megapolitics include determining electoral process outcomes, 
deciding on executive prerogatives, and ruling on the legitimacy of regime 
changes, matters of transitional justice, and cases in which the nation is 
defined via the courts (Hirschl 2008:7–13). The judicialization of politics 
is not a new phenomenon; it is a feature of established democracies, such 
as the United States, as well as countries that have undergone transition, 
such as those in Latin America (Domingo 2004:107). The degree and extent 
to which courts resolve political and social disputes vary from country to 
country: some countries in Southeast Asia, such as Thailand, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia, have witnessed an increase in the role of the courts in defining the 
political landscape, while others have not (Dressel 2010).
Courts on the African continent have made a fair contribution to the 
judicialization of megapolitics in the last two decades, despite not being 
situated in countries considered established democracies. Electoral process 
outcomes have been a common arena for judicialization. Courts have played 
a critical role in postelection disputes in Uganda in 2006, Ghana in 2013, 
Kenya in 2013, and Malawi in 2014 (Ellett 2015:6). Recent examples include 
Burundi’s Constitutional Court allowing Pierre Nkuruzinza, the incumbent 
president, to run for a third term in 20154 and the Zambian Constitutional 
Court’s dismissal of an election petition to annul the August 2016 election 
results.5
The courts are now active adjudicators of human and socioeconomic 
rights cases—matters of megapolitics.6 Before the year 2000, few cases 
focused on gender discrimination and women’s personal rights.7 Since then, 
numerous instances of judicial activism have occurred, including the ground-
breaking South African Constitutional Court decision regarding the rollout 
of antiretrovirals to HIV-positive mothers in 2002 and the recognition of the 
right of HIV-positive women to decide on sterilization in Namibia in 2012.8 
In Botswana, the courts confirmed the unconstitutionality of discriminatory 
customary law inheritance in 2013. In Uganda in 2015, a court found the 
payment of a bride-price refund to be unconstitutional.9
Judicial Interference: What Lies Beneath
Judicial interference is not exclusive to Africa, or to developing countries 
generally. Judiciaries in Canada, the United States, and even the United 
Kingdom also grapple with confrontational politics and public disdain, on 
varying levels.10 From an African perspective, Kwasi Prempeh, a renowned 
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constitutionalist, posits that historically, after the achievement of indepen-
dence in many African countries, “the idea of judicial independence—of a 
judicial function separate and apart from the executive and legislative func-
tions and of judges free from routine political control—would be among the 
first casualties of the illiberal ideologies” (Prempeh 2006). He explains that 
the colonial legal order had been conceived primarily for the purposes of 
dominance rather than legitimacy; thus, judicial independence was never a 
priority (Prempeh 2005). This context explains some of the difficulties still 
experienced in judiciaries today, but there is more to judicial interference 
than meets the eye.
Does judicial interference occur because the courts have become 
politicized and thus need to be reined in? Or do the courts descend into 
uncharted legal waters in response to the executive’s moves to disempower 
them? Hirshl believes:
An authentic, “bottom up” judicialization is more likely 
to occur when judicial institutions are perceived by social 
movements, interest groups, and political activists as more 
reputable, impartial, and effective decision-making bodies 
than other bureaucracy-heavy government institutions or 
biased majoritarian decision-making arenas. An all-encom-
passing judicialization of politics is, ceteris paribus, less 
likely to occur in a polity featuring a unified, assertive 
political system that is capable of restraining the judiciary. 
(Hirschl 2006:745)
The bottom-up judicialization that Hirschl describes relies on a judiciary 
that is empowered and influential and does not shy away from presiding over 
matters of megapolitics as part of the job. Such boldness leads people often to 
consider judges to be wilful architects of the countermajoritarian dilemma.
In contrast, judicialization may occur because a government seeks 
to centralize its control, reduce its accountability to the courts, or curtail 
citizens’ rights (Sunkin 1994:126). Ironically, what ensues in these cases is 
that the courts’ reaction to government restraint results in a move away 
from formal constitutional systems of accountability, in favor of more infor-
mal, less accessible, and less accountable methods of decision making. The 
knee-jerk reaction from government to limit how far the court can spread its 
tentacles serves only to galvanize judges to have an indelible impact, even in 
situations where the legislature may be better placed to do so.
Whether judicialization arises before judicial interference or vice versa, 
the struggle for power is clear—a struggle of which judicial independence is 
but one component. Other aspects of judicial power are the ability to make 
binding judgments, the ability to have these judgements enforced, and the 
presence of discretionary powers (Gillespie 2007:849). Then there is the 
struggle for political power, with the adjudication of megapolitics as the 
locus of the public’s respect. The impact of legal decisions can legitimate 
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judiciaries in people’s eyes. For instance, public support for the Thai Consti-
tutional Court grew immensely after the court’s decision to annul the April 
2006 elections, stripping Thaksin Shinawatra of his role as prime minister. 
The status of the South African judiciary was enhanced exponentially in 
2016, when the Constitutional Court held that the president should pay back 
a portion of public money spent on security upgrades at his homestead.11 
Sometimes, this increase in respect for the judiciary can mean a decrease in 
support for the executive.
When these struggles for power arise, judicial interference starts to 
appear in various forms. Six broad categories of judicial interference in south-
ern Africa have been identified. These are general institutional assaults, per-
sonal manipulation, remuneration manipulation, personal attacks, patronage 
and personal linkages, and communication (VonDoepp and Ellet 2011:153). 
In these instances, the executive and/or its allies use different means to 
convey similar messages when they disapprove of court decisions or believe 
that an impending judicial outcome will not be in their favor. Institutional 
assaults often take the form of legislative overrides of controversial rulings, 
and political tinkering with judicial appointment and tenure procedures to 
ensure the appointment of “compliant” judges and/or to block the appoint-
ment of “undesirable” ones (Hirschl 2006).
A commonly cited example of legislative override is the Indian case 
of Mohammed Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and Others,12 where 
a decision by the Supreme Court of India regarding the maintenance of a 
Muslim spouse by her husband was virtually overturned by parliament.13 
Overriding controversial rulings is fairly uncommon. It was possible in Shah 
Bano because of the backlash from Muslims, who perceived the decision as 
interfering with their identity. If the politics of the country are such that 
there exists a powerful—both political and financial—catalyst to push the 
government, such as seen in Shah Bano or in The Wik Peoples v. Queensland 
case,14 a decision can be overruled; however, this tactic shows the executive’s 
hand, exposing him or her to pressure from the opposition and civil society 
organizations.
Tinkering with judicial appointments as a form of institutional assault 
can be executed in a less risky manner. Take the ousting of former Chief 
Justice Anthony Gubbay in March 2001 by President Robert Mugabe and 
his ruling ZANUPF party. That action was sold on the need to indigenize 
the judiciary, and Gubbay was replaced with the outgoing Chief Justice 
Chidyasiku (Blair 2001). In Kenya, President Uhuru Kenyatta waited a year 
to appoint fourteen judges who had been recommended by the Judicial Ser-
vice Commission because he allegedly did not like the names on the list.15 
The delay was not illegal, as the power to appoint is vested in the president 
alone; therefore, unless tampering with the list or irrationality could have 
been proven, the president was technically well within in his rights. For 
weeding out undesirable judges, subtle methods such as these are safer for 
governments and can be used in a manner that will bring less scrutiny than 
overriding a court decision.
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Finally, “undue” pressure depends in part on the political climate 
and culture of the jurisdiction in question, the tier of the judiciary under 
consideration, and the leadership of the judiciary (Patterson 2006). In agree-
ment with this point, one judge stated that judicial independence sometimes 
depends on the political climate, because countries with a democratic deficit 
do not care much about judicial independence and find it an irritation.16 
Simply put, if a political party is in power today, yet cannot guarantee that 
it will stay in power when the next presidential election comes about, it 
is less likely to try to abuse the judiciary. The experiences of judiciaries in 
Uganda, the Gambia, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe (primarily between 2001 
and 2004), where judges and lawyers have suffered from informal interfer-
ence, seem to support this view. These examples have a common factor: the 
same political party, president, or monarch had or has been at the helm for 
at least two decades.
Executive Interference: Zambia, The Gambia, and Burundi
When tension exists between the roles of the judiciary and the executive, 
sometimes the case in question has nothing to do with megapolitics, as has 
occurred in Zambia. On 30 May 2012, judges Nigel Mutuna and Charles 
Kajimanga of the High Court, and judge Phillip Musonda of the Supreme 
Court, received a written letter of suspension from President Michael 
Sata, with no reasons provided. The president held a press conference on 
the same day, stating that by the powers vested in him under articles 98(2)
(3) and (5) of the Zambian Constitution, he would appoint a tribunal to
investigate allegations of the said judges’ incompetence and misbehavior.
The judges countered that at no point had any such allegations been made
known to them or to the Judicial Complaints Authority, as prescribed
under the Judicial Code of Conduct Act No. 13 of 1999. Judges Mutuna and
Kajimanga sought an ex parte order for leave to apply for judicial review
and a stay of the president’s decision—which was granted on 14 May by
the High Court.
The attorney general appealed to the Supreme Court after a bid to 
discharge the leave failed, and it was at that stage that Judge Musonda 
joined the proceedings. The Supreme Court of Appeal, by a majority of four 
to three, found that the president had unfettered powers in exercising the 
powers vested in him under articles 98(2)(3) and (5).17 The court, even though 
it found that the president had not usurped the powers of the Judicial Com-
plaints Authority or those of the Chief Justice, advised that “considering 
the circumstances of the matter, the tribunal should not proceed.”18 This 
decision was widely criticized,19 with renowned academic Professor Ndulo 
stating that until this decision, he had believed that African judiciaries had 
emerged from the period of powerlessness and marginalization at the hands 
of “imperial presidents”; he stated that article 98 had not been drafted to 
become the conduit of executive influence over the judiciary, and removing 
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judges from the bench on spurious grounds was the greatest threat to judicial 
independence (Ndulo 2016:3).
Judge Musonda resigned in 2013, and judges Mutuna and Kajimanga 
were reinstated in 2015. The former is now a judge of the Supreme Court, 
and the latter has since stated that the trigger for his and Judge Mutuna’s 
suspension had been a judgment delivered by the latter in Development 
Bank of Zambia v. Post Newspapers Ltd, JCN Holdings Ltd and Mutembo 
Nchito. Kajimanga’s “crime” had been allocating the case to Judge Mutuna, 
whose decision went against the defendants—who had close connections to 
President Sata (Kajimanga 2016:3). In an interview with an anonymous judge 
of a superior court in Zambia, I was informed that the defendants were not 
only close to the president, but financially and politically powerful, having 
had ties to Sata before he had taken office.20 The brave action by Mutuna 
in the high-stakes court case confirms the view that judges in Zambia still 
retain some capacity for disrupting the political agendas of those in power 
(VonDoepp 2009:16).
It is striking that the above Supreme Court decision was handed down 
when Chibesakunda was still acting as chief justice, despite having reached 
retirement age. Parliament had declined to ratify her appointment as a per-
manent chief justice, but Sata was willing to bend the rules to appoint her. 
Thus, her decision in the Kajimanga case was considered by some as a move 
to curry favor with Sata and ensure that she would be permanently appointed 
as chief justice. Her actions may therefore be remembered for giving the 
impression that she was interested more in cementing her position than in 
shoring up the independence of the judiciary.
The experience of the Zambian judges, however, pales in comparison 
to that of Judge Mable Agyemang, now of the Ghanaian High Court. Judge 
Agyemang was appointed chief justice of The Gambia in August 2013, with 
an impressive judicial track record, having served as an appellate court judge 
for the Commonwealth Secretariat. After just six months in office, she fled 
the country in the middle of the night, having been informed that she had 
been removed from her post without prior notice or a disciplinary hearing. 
President Yahya Jammeh has publicly stated that she was taking orders from 
a hostile country (Ocloo 2012), but she believes that it is because she was a 
perceived to be a “human-rights judge.” It was feared that she would release 
political prisoners condemned to death, as she had previously released oppo-
sition detainees in 2002.21 Before this incident, the International Bar Associa-
tion (2006) had expressed concern that over time, the government’s actions 
had undermined judicial independence and the rule of law, and it noted that 
in the preceding few years, one judge’s contract had not been renewed, one 
had been forced to resign, and one had been forcibly removed; in all these 
instances, each judge had given judgments that were not in the government’s 
favor.22 In 2013 alone, three chief justices were dismissed, with Ali Nawaz 
Chawhan, Agyemang’s successor, removed after only a year in office (Ocloo 
2012). The use of foreign judges is a curious aspect of the Gambian situation. 
Nigerian national Amelia Izuako, a former Gambian judge, commenting on 
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the fact that the Court of Appeal had no permanent judges and so foreign 
judges from the High Court would sit as ad-hoc judges, emphasizes that 
from her experience, this pattern did not ensure confidence in the system, 
and that to have an indigenous bench (what she calls a Gambianized higher 
bench), there needed to be greater institutional security, financial security, 
and security of tenure, so that it would be worthwhile for Gambian judges 
(Izuako 2009:99–100).
In May 2017, six judges from Nigeria and Sierra Leone had been sched-
uled to sit on the Court of Appeal to hear Jammeh’s petition disputing the 
December 2016 presidential election results (Kamara and Ahotonu 2016). 
Persistent mediation from the Economic Community of West African States 
ultimately led Jammeh to relinquish power, eliminating the need for the 
court to hear the matter.23 Appointing foreign judges to hear a case of such 
great significance gave the impression that Jammeh did not trust the Gam-
bian judges. From the perspective of a Gambian judge, it may have been safer 
not to be involved in a highly political petition that would have had serious 
ramifications, whichever way it was decided. Nonetheless, if Jammeh did 
not trust Gambian judges to deliver a decision in his favor, did he consider 
foreign judges to be more compliant? As contract judges, foreign personnel 
would not necessarily have been vested in the judiciary and country as a 
whole. They may not have had a legitimate reason to decide impartially, 
knowing that they would not reap the effects of the decision. Still, foreign 
judges like Agyemang, Izuako, and others have exhibited the type of indepen-
dence that had them dismissed. Thus, perhaps it was not just about foreign 
judges, but about getting the “right” type of foreign judge.
Finally, I return to the Burundi Constitutional Court’s decision that 
backed President Nkurunziza’s bid for a third term. The judgment was 
signed by five Constitutional Court justices and appeared to be unanimous. 
Constitutional Court Vice President Sylvere Nimpagaritse later revealed 
that the court had been forced to validate the decision (Al Jazeera 2016). He 
told the media that the justices had initially found Nkurunziza ineligible to 
run for another term. After that decision, the Constitutional Court justices 
all received threatening phone calls.24 The remaining justices then changed 
their decision to favor Nkurunziza because, according to Nimpagaritse, “if 
we did not give the third term a green light, we were going to be in trouble” 
(Al Jazeera 2016). Considering the continued deaths and human-rights vio-
lations that have occurred since that decision, the case provides a clear 
illustration of how interference in judicial independence has ripple effects 
throughout society.
The Chief Justice as the Antagonist:  
The Cases of Swaziland and Botswana
When a judiciary as an institution experiences external attacks on its integ-
rity, it can withstand attempts of interference from external influences if 
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it has a dependable chief justice. A strong and able chief justice can per-
sonify the independence of the judiciary and exemplify that independence 
in the conduct of judicial proceedings in his or her court (Commonwealth 
Magistrates and Judges Association 2014). The role of the chief justice 
has four key aspects: intellectual leadership, managing judicial matters, 
administrative leadership, and representing and defending the judiciary 
where needed (Leakey 2012). An example of a chief justice giving effect 
to the last- mentioned aspect occurred in the South African judiciary on 8 
July 2015, when the judiciary held an unprecedented press conference with 
twenty-seven of the country’s top judges, led by Chief Justice Mogoeng. 
The judiciary sought to respond to what it called “repeated and unfounded 
criticism of the judiciary” (Grootes 2015).25 The chief justice believed it was 
necessary to reaffirm the judiciary’s independence and protect his judges, 
notwithstanding criticism from the ruling party.
In Judge Thomas Masuku’s case in Swaziland, however, it was Chief 
Justice Michael Ramodebedi who proved to be the persecutor of his own 
judge, thereby taking an unprecedented primary role in dismantling, subvert-
ing, and abrogating the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary in 
Swaziland (Masuku 2016). Masuku, who had been on the Swazi bench since 
1999, was suspended on 28 June 2011 in a manner shrouded with suspicion. 
He was accused of insulting the Swazi king. The end of his judicial career in 
Swaziland was largely attributed to the chief justice at the time, who was 
both the judge and juror in the case (International Commission for Jurists 
2016). Masuku subsequently filed a complaint with the African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples’ Rights,26 and has since been appointed a judge 
in Namibia.27
Chief justices must ensure that lower levels of the judiciary respect 
admonishments not to allow partisan interference in legal proceedings 
(Widner 1999:183), but when chief justices themselves are the conduit for 
partisan interference, the foundations of the judiciary are compromised. 
Ramodebedi is said to have failed to protect and defend the institutional 
independence of the judiciary, and played a reprehensible role in undermin-
ing the institutional independence of the judiciary and that of individual 
judges (International Commission for Jurists 2016:5). He is reported to have 
issued a practice directive, abrogating fair process in allocating cases and 
allowed himself to intervene in allocating sensitive and political cases.28 
Thereafter, the government won all its cases in the Supreme Court, prompt-
ing the head of government to celebrate openly—by hosting a lunch in 
honor of those responsible for his unprecedented victories (Masuku 2016:2). 
Ramodebedi himself would face impeachment charges and be removed from 
office in July 2015.
As chief justice, one is not only the head of the judiciary in a legal 
sense, but also a manager. Malawian Chief Justice Andrew Nyirenda has 
stated that being a chief justice is an immense responsibility, and one has to 
draw a delicate balance as a leader because “one is dealing with colleagues 
who have equal knowledge and experience, some even more experienced than 
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you.”29 Where judicial independence is increasing, chief justices often pursue 
several tactics simultaneously to strengthen the judiciary’s position (Widner 
1999:81). These include altering executive perspectives when necessary, 
improving the effectiveness of the judiciary, and building constituencies. 
These tactics do not appear to have been followed in Botswana.
At the 2015 Annual Judicial Conference in Mahalapye, Botswana, 
some judges voiced concern that the judiciary was in need of additional 
resources for the continuous training of judicial officers and support staff, 
and they recommended that judicial leadership should seek resources for 
training.30 Aggrieved by the suggestion, Chief Justice Maruping Dibotelo 
accused some of the judges of misappropriating housing allowances errone-
ously paid to them; he publicly claimed that they were thieves, and vowed 
to destroy their careers (Garekwe 2016:20). Not long thereafter, Judge Key 
Dingake of the Gaborone High Court and judges Modiri Letsididi, Mercy 
Garekwe, and J. Ranier Busang of the Labotse High Court all received letters 
dated 10 August 2015. The letters were from the chief justice, written in his 
capacity as chairman of the Judicial Service Commission. They stated that 
the government payroll section had erroneously been paying them housing 
allowances for a considerable period of time, without the government’s con-
sent, and that the matter was being reported to the police for investigation. 
The judges denied the allegation of criminal conduct, expressing concern at 
Dibotelo’s public statement to destroy their careers, and requesting that he 
resign or face the possibility of impeachment.31
On 26 August, the four judges received letters of suspension from Presi-
dent Ian Khama, informing them that a tribunal had been appointed to decide 
whether they were fit to hold office.32 The suspension led to a public outcry 
and criticism from numerous bodies.33 A statement from the Law Society of 
Botswana expressed concern at the chief justice’s conduct in interfering with 
other judges; it “resolved that the latest actions of the Chief Justice clearly 
lend credence to the call for him to either resign or face impeachment.”34 
The president rejected a request to lift the suspensions, and an urgent appli-
cation to have them set aside was turned down by the High Court.35 Later, a 
request to have an impartial tribunal composed of judges who had no ties to 
the Botswanan judiciary was turned down. A subsequent audit report found 
that other judges—who had not been charged—had received the allowances 
erroneously, and the department had continually failed to deduct the over-
payment from their salaries, as requested by Dingake and another judge.36 
The suspension of the judges has since been lifted as of late March 2017 and 
the tribunal has been disbanded. Yet, the incident remains a stark reminder 
of just how precarious the position of a judge can be.37
Admirably, the response from the Law Society and the public showed 
that Botswana is not an environment in which judicial interference will 
go unchallenged. In addition, while members of the bar in the region had 
previously only irregularly raised their voices on behalf of the judiciary, the 
bar in Botswana appears to have done so when it mattered most. The bar in 
Swaziland was also vocal when Masuku was ousted, and so, too, in Zambia 
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during the saga of Kajimanga and others and when Chibesakunda was being 
primed for the role of permanent chief justice.38
Chief justices must strike a delicate balance, in which they lead the 
judiciary as an institution, but do not influence individual judges in an inap-
propriate way through their leadership (Leakey 2012). This delicate balance 
is one that must remain at the fore of all judicial operations if a judiciary is 
to avoid a repeat of the above examples.
Judges as Social Actors: What Now?
Some view judges through their preferences and patterns of decision 
making, but others view them as creative protagonists in the process of 
judicial development (VonDoepp 2009:27). Thus, they are more than just 
actors wielding influential power through decision making, but are rather 
individualistic agencies for the creation of a better, richer, and more respected 
judicial system. With the judicialization of politics, an appreciation of judges 
as protectors of their own autonomy is necessary, and the first step toward 
this is acknowledging judges as social and political actors (Trochev and Ellet 
2014:68). The idea that judges are social and political actors is supported by 
instances where African judges have played a central role in initiating bids for 
greater independence (Widner 1999). There is evidence of this in the numer-
ous chapters of the International Association of Women Judges scattered 
over the region. These chapters have issued statements concerning the inad-
equate legislation on violence against women and human trafficking—which 
would be considered the domain of the legislature.39 Here, they have entered 
the fray outside the courtroom to use their collective agency to prompt the 
development of necessary legislation as a means to curb social ills.
Another aspect of judicial autonomy concerns judges’ behavior outside 
the courthouse, as judges’ informal relationships with other social actors 
shape the nature and boundaries of judicial autonomy, affecting the social 
construction of judicial power (Trochev and Ellet 2014:68). There is evidence 
of this in the career of Francis Nyalili, a chief justice of Tanzania who notably 
traversed the political, judicial, and public space. He is said to have provided 
a window for “understanding the interactions between judges, politicians, 
and the public throughout the African region and the consequences for judi-
cial independence and the rule of law” (Widner 2001:68). Other judges have 
taken to conducting lectures in law schools or writing in academic journals, 
and in the process have earned academic admiration and support. Those who 
have written legal articles for newspapers or hosted talk shows, like South 
African Judge Dennis Davis,40 have brought the law to the people and earned 
the respect of the public outside the courtroom. The consequence of such 
activities is that, when judicial interference occurs, these stakeholders feel 
they have an interest in defending the judiciary’s independence; therefore, 
they offer an informal strategy of survival for judges seeking to protect their 
autonomy and maintain their influence (Trochev and Ellet 2014).
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Ultimately, how can the recognition of judges as social actors and the 
social construction of judicial power assist with judicial independence? I 
suggest that judicial education is but one solution to this. This education 
can take various forms, such as judge’s forums organized by external bodies, 
which merely facilitate conversations on topical issues, such as the use 
of foreign law in judgments and the rights of sexual minorities.41 To avoid 
any perception of undue influence by the organizers, it is crucial that such 
forums be chaired by sitting or retired judges. The education could also take 
the form of continued legal education that orients new judges and provides 
practical tips for judgment writing.42 Judicial education not only reminds 
judges of their responsibilities, but provides the means by which judges can 
learn from colleagues and be forewarned and forearmed to face likely sources 
of undue influence. This will assist them in defending their independence.
Furthermore, the creation of regional networks among judges is impor-
tant. Judges have started to form regional communities that have served as 
advocates for denouncing acts of interference. During the sagas of judges 
Masuku and Agyemang, judges from the region not only provided emotional 
support, but lent their voices to the cause.43 The mentioned incidents were 
a precursor of the creation of the African Judges and Jurists’ Forum, which 
seeks to enhance the rule of law, good governance, and economic growth 
through standard setting, judicial and legal reform support, and rule-of-law-
related capacity-development initiatives.44 Its creation shows that African 
judges are no longer satisfied with being members only of international 
bodies, such as the Commonwealth Magistrates and Judges Association. 
They want a creation of their own, where they can have an authentic, indig-
enous voice on matters that are particularly contentious in the region, even if 
they may be happening elsewhere. The creation of such bodies may harness 
the power of the collective and send a message that any undue interference 
with one judge interferes with the independence of all.
While the Botswana judges were on suspension, their plight continued 
to be a topic of debate and discussion at regional forums. It galvanized not 
only the bar in Botswana, but also regional bodies, such as the Southern 
African Development Community Lawyers Association (SADCLA). These 
stakeholders were concerned not only for their respective judiciaries, but for 
other judges, whom they recognized as being pivotal to the greater aim of 
rich judicial development. Judges without allies are more vulnerable. Once 
the wider community gets involved, be it the bar, magistrates, academics, or 
civil-society organizations, it makes it that much harder for executives and 
chief justices to do as they please. By creating and maintaining relationships 
with stakeholders who are not part of the judiciary, judges in the region can 
engender a sense of ownership in the judiciary and build a second line of 
defense for themselves.
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Conclusion
The focus of this article is to draw attention to instances of judicial interfer-
ence as a way of highlighting the challenges involved in maintaining judicial 
independence. Judicial independence does not exist so judges can “go rogue” 
and undermine the rule of law: it exists to enable judges to deliver impartial 
justice free from external pressures, for the benefit of the community (Izuako 
2009:94). Academics and lawyers need to be more vigilant in ensuring that 
judges can operate in environments in which they can exercise their func-
tions without fear, favor, or prejudice. The examples cited in this article are 
just the tip of the iceberg, and as courts grow bolder, more such instances 
are yet to come:
[a]s legal reasoning develops, judges do not become immune 
from extraneous political and moral ideas, but rather the 
particular form in which political or moral ideas enter the 
law is determined by the law’s sense of its own purpose and 
usefulness. (Gillespie 2007)
The usefulness and purpose of the law will be determined by those who 
make judicial decisions and those who have to abide by them. The shift-
ing of goal posts is inevitable, and whether it is to the judges’ detriment or 
benefit will depend on how well they navigate their roles as social actors. It 
will also depend on whether the constructions of social power can be built 
in a manner that protects judges’ autonomy. The more allies are aware of the 
challenges faced by judges and are willing to defend judiciaries, the stronger 
the judiciary will be.
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NOTES
1. Twenty lower court judges have since been dismissed, while some High Court judges are 
facing impeachment.
2. The tenures of presidents Yoweri Museveni and Robert Mugabe and Burundi’s Pierre 
Nkurunziza are an example.
3. Among others, article 26 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981.
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4. For a translation of the Burundi case, see http://www.ihrda.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05 
/Judgment-of-Burundi-Constitutional-Court-ENGLISH-Translation.pdf.
5. Filed by the opposition party, the United National Democratic Party.
6. As described by Hirschl in his five categories of megapolitics.
7. Before 2000, Unity Dow v. Attorney-General 1991 Blr 233 (HC) in Botswana, Longwe v. Inter-
continental Hotel 1992/HP/765 (HC) in Zambia, and the South African case of Whitehead v. 
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd (C 122/98) [1999] ZALC 82 (28 May 1999).
8. Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 1) (CCT9/02) [2002] 
ZACC 16, LM and Others v. Government of the Republic of Namibia (I 1603/2008, I 3518/2008, I 
3007/2008) [2012] NAHC 211.
9. Mmusi and Others v. Ramantele and Another (MAHLB-000836-10) [2012] BWHC 1 and Mifumi 
(U) Ltd & 12 Others v. Attorney General, Kenneth Kakuru (Constitutional Petition No.12 of 2007) 
[2010] UGCC 2 (26 March 2010).
10. Beloff 2000:153.
11. Economic Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the National Assembly and Others and Democratic 
Alliance v. Speaker of the National Assembly and Others
12. (1985 SCR (3) 844).
13. India’s parliament bowed to massive political pressure by conservative Muslims and overruled 
the Indian Supreme Court’s decision by passing the Muslim Women’s (Protection of Rights of 
Divorce) Act.
14. (1996) 141 ALR 129. In Wik, the government bowed to pressure from the mining and agricul-
tural sector and introduced amendments to the Native Title Act that overrode Wik.
15. Interview with a member of the Kenyan Law Society who was interviewed for a Democratic 
Governance and Rights Unit project on 10 August 2016.
16. Discussion with a judge based in the region.
17. Appeal No. 088/2012 [2013] ZMSC 38 (9 May 2013); SCZ/8/185/2012.
18. The tribunal was to be headed by Lovemore Chikopa, a Malawian judge.
19. See Elias Munshya wa Munshya, “With Forked Tongues: Why Chibesakunda’s Majority Ruling 
in Attorney-General v. Mutuna & Others Is Flawed,” https://eliasmunshya.org/2013/07/01 
/with-forked-tongues-why-chibesakundas-majority-ruling-in-attorney-general-v-mutuna 
-others-is-flawed.
20. Anonymous interview conducted at the court residence on 2 December 2016.
21. Minutes of the SADC Judges Forum, hosted by the DGRU on 8–10 May 2015, in Windhoek, 
Namibia.
22. Nigerian Judge Izuako, former Chief Justice Brobbey, and Gambian jurist Justice Jallow.
23. Jammeh eventually agreed to step down on 20 January 2017 after mediation efforts that 
lasted two months.
24. He is currently exiled in Rwanda.
25. The judiciary had received a barrage of criticism following a decision that the failure to take 
steps to arrest and/or detain Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, President of the Republic of 
Sudan, was inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See 
Southern African Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice & Constitutional Development and Others 
2016 (1) SACR 161 (GP).
26. Communication 444/13—Justice Thomas Masuku (represented by Lawyers for Human Rights 
Swaziland) v. Swaziland.
27. The commission’s decision is still pending.
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28. The report can be found on the ICJ website.
29. Stated at the SADC Judges Forum held at Mangochi Beach Resort, Malawi, in September 2016.
30. Information contained in a letter written to the Judicial Service Commission by twelve judges, 
dated 17 August 2015, which is in the author’s possession.
31. Letter to the Chief Justice, dated 12 August, which is in the author’s possession.
32. Presidential letters addressed to all judges, which states that their suspension would 
commence on 1 September 2015, which are in the author’s possession.
33. Amnesty International at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/10/botswana 
-suspension-of-judges-potentially-threatens-freedom-of-expression-and-judicial 
-independence/ and the SADC Lawyers Association at http://citizen.co.za/807102/lawyers 
-call-for-return-of-four-suspended-botswana-judges.
34. The chief justice had offered “amnesty” to eight other judges who had petitioned for his 
removal. They were offered amnesty if they retracted their statements, and as of September 
2015, three had done so.
35. Decision by Justice Tebogo Tau.
36. An electronic copy of the report by the Department of Administrative Justice is in the author’s 
possession.
37. Judge Mercy Garekwe will resume work at the end of June 2017, with the others doing so later 
in the year when the terms of the judges acting in their stead ends..
38. See statements from the SADC Lawyers Association and other media reports from respective 
bars.
39. The Nigerian, Tanzanian, and Kenyan chapters of the association in particular are very active.
40. Davis’s show, Judge for Yourself, aired weekly, critically analyzes South Africa’s myriad political 
and socioeconomic issues.
41. The DGRU, based at the University of Cape Town, hosts such forums annually, in South Africa 
and in other countries in the region.
42. DGRU and the International Commission of Jurists have partnered to form the Judicial Insti-
tute for Africa, chaired by current and former judges, which runs twice a year at no cost to 
participants.
43. Both judges expressed their gratitude for this.
44. Founded 23 November 2012.
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